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The idea inspiring the present issue of China Perspectives is that thereare certain communities – or groups, or fields – in Chinese civil societythat can be most readily expected to promote the strengthening of
universal values underpinning human rights. These values include freedom
of conscience and speech, freedom of association and the right to political
participation, and liberty of the person – basic liberties. (1)
Civil society and liberal democratic values
In different ways, communities of journalists, human rights defenders in-
cluding in particular lawyers, religious communities, and nongovernmental
organisations (NGO) involved in the provision of social services or advocacy
can be especially important to the promotion of these values. Journalist
communities, religious groups, and NGOs are also dependent on freedom
of speech, (2) conscience, (3) and association, (4) whereas rights lawyers are en-
gaged in the defence of the rights to due process, a fair trial, and access to
justice. (5) In non-liberal, nondemocratic political systems, support from in-
ternational or transnational civil society is an especially important further
aspect. Accordingly, the contributions to this volume discuss these fields
and aspects.
Our project had to overcome some challenges, beginning with the contro-
versial question of whether, even assuming that the idea of “civil society”
makes sense, a civil society can exist in (post-) authoritarian China. Addressing
this question, this introduction argues for a liberal conception of civil society,
and on the basis of this conception discusses the contributions on the par-
ticular Chinese civil society fields contained in this issue. An insight emerging
from all the contributions is that political pressure on – and sometimes re-
pression of – civil society is met by the strengthening and diversification of
resources to resist pressure, and often contributes to rising consciousness of
the institutional safeguards needed for a genuine civil society.
Conceptual issues: Civil society in China
between “gongmin” and “minjian”
There is no universally accepted definition of “civil society,” because to
say a civil society exists is to make an evaluative judgement. Interpretations
have produced different conceptions ranging from the sociological to the
(more explicitly normative) political. (6) These have different virtues. The clas-
sic, liberal political conception is often traced back to Tocqueville’s account
of eighteenth century American society, characterised, in his view, by the
prevalence of associations, formed freely and voluntarily for non-commer-
cial purposes, to serve some aspect of the common good – formed, thus, in
the civic or “civil” spirit to be found in democratic political systems. (7) From
the perspective of Tocqueville and those he greatly influenced, the existence
of civil society is clearly tied to a particular society’s democratic political
organisation. This might hold the promise that a strengthening of civil so-
ciety could result in a strengthening also of the demand for democratic
change. But it could also suggest that in politically hostile conditions, civil
society cannot emerge.
Adam Michnik’s “Towards a Civil Society” remains an important and, in
China, also influential twentieth century reflection on the optimistic polit-
ical reasoning Tocqueville’s account led to on the part of democracy ac-
tivists in Eastern Europe. (8) Under the pressure of the systems they lived in,
direct and in a narrow sense “political” opposition, e.g., through the forma-
tion of a political party or underground movement aiming to gain govern-
ment power or overthrow the system, was on the one hand not as eligible
as a more diffuse, less direct, broader, and non-violent strategy. On the other
hand, just because these systems were totalitarian (at least from the per-
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1. A conception of “basic liberties” is developed e.g. in John Rawls’ version of liberalism. Rawls’ ac-
count lists the right to vote and run for office, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of con-
science, freedom of personal property, and freedom from arbitrary arrest (A Theory of Justice,
Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 53). For criticism of this “parsimo-
nious” account, see e.g. John Tasioulas, “Human Rights” entry in Routledge Companion to the Phi-
losophy of Law (forthcoming, 2012).
2. Relevant formulations can be found in Article 35 of the 1982 PRC Constitution (last revised 2004,
“the PRC Constitution”), Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), for example. (The
PRC has signed but not yet ratified the ICCPR.)
3. The right to freedom of religion is recognised in Article 36 of the PRC Constitution. See also Article
18 ICCPR and Article 18 UDHR on the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.
4. Cf. Article 35 of the PRC Constitution; Articles 21, 22 ICCPR, Article 20 UDHR.
5. On the broader topic of access to justice in China, see Jayshree Bajoria, “Access to Justice in China,”
www.cfr.org/china/access-justice-china/p15745 (consulted on 20 August 2012), and Fu Hualing,
“Access to Justice in China: Potentials, Limits, and Alternatives,” draft, September 2009, via
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1474073 (consulted on 20 August 2012).
International law does not explicitly protect an abstract right to access to justice, but this right is
implicit in substantive and procedural rights guarantees (see for example Article 2 ICCPR, Article
8 UDHR). Relevant domestic constitutional provisions include Articles 33, 37, and 41 of the PRC
Constitution.
6. For an excellent and more extensive discussion of the intellectual origins of civil society discourse
– addressing such diverse influences as Hannah Arendt, Juergen Habermas, Amitai Eztioni, Robert
Nisbet, and Jonathan Unger – see Chan Kin-man, Zou xiang gongmin shehui (Towards a civil so-
ciety), Hong Kong, UP Publications Limited, 2010, chapter 1.
7. Alexis de Tocqueville, De la Démocratie en Amérique, 1835, available at www.ecole-
alsacienne.org/CDI/pdf/1400-0107/14096_TOCQ1.pdf and www.ecole-alsacienne.org/CDI/pdf/
1400-0107/14097_TOCQ2.pdf (links consulted on 20 August 2012); e.g., at p. 391 (Part I). " That
Providence has given to every human being the degree of reason necessary to direct himself in
the affairs which interest him exclusively — such is the grand maxim upon which civil and political
society rests in the United States. The father of a family applies it to his children; the master to
his servants; the township to its officers; the province to its townships; the State to its provinces;
the Union to the States; and when extended to the nation, it becomes the doctrine of the sover-
eignty of the people".
8. Adam Michnik, “Towards a Civil Society: Hopes for Polish Democracy: Interview with Erica Blair
(John Keane),” pp. 104 ff, in Adam Michnik, Letters from Freedom: Post-Cold War Realities and
Perspectives, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998, pp. 96-113.
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spective of those who opposed them), the formation of communities re-
sisting domination by the state was certain to be effective, even if such
communities did not directly engage in struggles for political power. “The
path of perseverant struggle toward reform, the path toward broader civil
and human rights, is the only path for dissidents in East Europe.” Asked how
the concept of civil society, “this old-fashioned eighteenth century term,”
could be relevant to Poland in the 1980s, Michnik replied:
In the totalitarian order, the state is the teacher and society is the pupil
in the classroom, which is sometimes converted into a prison or a mil-
itary camp. In a civil society, by contrast, people do not want to be
pupils, soldiers, or slaves; they act as citizens… The point is that, as cit-
izens, we in the democratic opposition don’t want to be treated any
longer as children or slaves. The basic principle of the anti-feudal move-
ment was human rights, the idea that everyone has rights equal to
those of the monarch. That’s what we also want. We want everybody
to enjoy the same rights as Jaruzelski, secured by the rule of law. (9)
Together with some of his other essays, Michnik’s Toward a Civil Society
was translated into Chinese by Cui Weiping, today an important public in-
tellectual in China. (10)
On the other hand, as pointed out by Anthony Spires in his discussion of
NGOs in China, (11) and as echoed especially in Carsten Vala’s contribution
on religious communities, (12) “civil society” is capable of an interpretation
that makes it appear supportive of, rather than a challenge to, authoritarian
political orders. Spires contrasts “Tocquevillean” with “corporatist” perspec-
tives on civil society, and points out that in authoritarian political environ-
ments, the corporatist organisation of realms of social life that in a
Tocquevillean democracy would fall within the spheres of civic responsibil-
ities means that the organisations responsible for them can become instru-
ments of control that are in turn controlled by the authoritarian State. (13)
To illustrate this phenomenon for China, we may think not only of the All
China Federation of Women, the All China Federation of the Disabled, and
the All China Federation of Trade Unions, but also of numerous more re-
cently created government-organised nongovernmental organisations, or
GONGOs. (14) If there were an authoritarian normative conception of “civil
society,” it would thus have to be corporatist, and it would challenge the
democratic conception.
It is the reality of authoritarian corporatist constraints in Chinese society
today that appears to motivate sociologists such as the eminent Sun Liping
of Tsinghua University to express persistent doubts as to whether China has
any civil society at all. Characteristically, Sun’s account of “civil society,” like
that of many scholars in China engaging with this term, is normatively
charged along the lines of Tocqueville and Michnik, while at the same time
setting up criteria that would have to be empirically satisfied for civil society
to exist in China. Following Xiao Gongqin, (15) Sun distinguishes three levels
of normative depth: Firstly, in civil society, that is, in a gongmin shehui (公
民社会) or “citizens’ society,” there are free individual citizens. The concept
of the individual citizen, or in Chinese gongmin (公民), is juxtaposed with
renmin (人民), “the people,” a plural word that connotes collectivity and
does not admit of individual enumeration. Renmin is of course preferred by
traditional CCP language. Secondly, the citizens in civil society have civic
responsibilities; and thirdly, they have individual rights. (16) Patently, in Sun’s
view, China does not have such a society “yet.” As recently as three years
ago he expresses himself tired of asking the young scholars at his research
institute working on “civil society studies” when Chinese civil society will
finally “arrive.”
Seeking a middle-ground position, other scholars such as Xiao Gongqin
suggest that civil society could be conceived of as less opposed to the state,
less like what Xiao terms the “Anglo-American model” of civil society, and
more cooperating with it in the spirit of continental European social democ-
racy. Certainly, Xiao points out, China has changed dramatically compared
to the Mao Zedong era, when in a certain sense there was not even a “so-
ciety” to speak of, let alone a “civil society” – when the ideology of the om-
nipotent state (quanneng guojia zhuyi 全能国家主义 ) ruled out the
existence of society as something juxtaposed with and potentially inde-
pendent of the state. (17)
In part perhaps from a sense that the expression “gongmin shehui” would
fail to reflect the reality of their own current society, some of those who
caution against applying the term to China opt for the normatively less
charged minjian shehui (民间社会). In its most literal translation, minjian
means simply “among the people,” and unlike gongmin (“citizen”), it has no
liberal connotations. With deliberate awkwardness reflecting its function as
a makeshift term, minjian shehui might be translated as “folk society.” It
also evokes the old, traditional juxtaposition of officials (guan 官) and com-
mon people (min 民) and suggests dualism as opposed to the complex plu-
ralism of a “citizens’ society” in which citizens have the right to organise
and challenge the government in a number of ways.
Another reason for a tacit change to minjian shehui in some of the main-
stream media appears to be that in recent months and years, the authori-
tarian hard-line wing of China’s political leadership has chosen to reject the
concept of “civil society / gongmin shehui” altogether. Some trace this ex-
plicit rejection back to a May 2011 article by Zhou Benshun, a member of
the (then) powerful Political-Legal Committee under Zhou Yongkang. Zhou
Benshun proposed “social management with Chinese characteristics”
(Zhongguo tese shehui guanli中国特色社会管理), a term reflecting the au-
thoritarian corporatist notions already discussed above. One of the central
passages of Zhou Benshun’s speech is worth quoting:
To innovate social management, our political and institutional ad-
vantages must be brought into full play. The structure of social man-
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9. Adam Michnik, “Toward a Civil Society,” in Adam Michnik, Letters from Freedom, op. cit. In the
same piece, Michnik comments on the inability of Western observers to view the then Eastern
Europe as “totalitarian” because, he says, the concept of totalitarianism in Western society is
charged with images of Hitler and Stalin.
10. See Cui Weiping’s translation, Tongwang gongmin shehui, 1996, available online at
www.marxists.org/chinese/PDF/06/112101.pdf (consulted on 20 August 2012).
11. Anthony Spires, “Contingent Symbiosis and Civil Society in an Authoritarian State: Understanding
the Survival of China’s Grassroots NGOs,” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 117, no. 1, July 2011,
pp. 1-45.
12. See Carsten Vala’s article in this issue, “Protestant Christianity and Civil Society in Authoritarian
China.”
13. Spires, art. cit., pp. 2 ff.
14. For a discussion of relevant numbers, see the contributions by Chan and Wu and by Kellogg in
this issue.
15. Sun refers to the work of Xiao Gongqin, but without citation (see below footnote 17).
16. Sun Liping, “Zhongguo you mei you gongmin shehui?”, (Does China have a civil society?), 18 Au-
gust 2009, http://sun-liping.i.sohu.com/blog/view/129843127.htm (consulted on 20 August
2012).
17. Xiao Gongqin, “Fazhan gongmin shehui zhi Zhongguo lujing” (The path to Chinese civil society
development), 28 July 2012, www.chinese-thought.org/zwsx/010039.htm (consulted on 20 Au-
gust 2012). For a critical discussion see e.g. Joseph Fewsmith, “‘Social Management’ as a Way of
Coping with Heightened Social Tensions,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 36, Winter 2012, pointing
out that the term “social management” was first used prominently by CCP General Secretary Hu
Jintao at a Politburo study session in September 2010.
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agement whereby Party committees lead, the government bears re-
sponsibility, society coordinates, and the masses participate gives
concrete expression to our political and institutional advantage, is
the root of strengthening and innovating social management, and
must be energetically improved. We must insist on consolidating the
Party’s rule, guaranteeing the country’s lasting stability and durable
peace, and ensuring that the people live and work in peace and con-
tentment. Problems of non-conformity between social management
and the new situation must be solved realistically, avoiding mistaken
beliefs and misrepresentations that could eventually cause us to fall
into the trap of so-called “civil society,” set up for us by some West-
ern countries …. (18)
Since then, there has been a sustained turn against “civil society,” at least
at the level of the Party’s political rhetoric. At the end of July 2012, a widely
noted editorial in the overseas edition of People’s Daily on groups in society
that were potentially hostile to the party-state triggered references to them
as the “New Five Black Categories” (xin hei wu lei 新黑五类). (19) Having crit-
icised Western and in particular American efforts to undermine China, the
editorial continues:
With “Internet freedom” as their slogan, they will attack “top down”
governance in order to promote the traditional model of liberal democ-
racy. Through the use of “rights lawyers,” underground religion, dissi-
dents, Internet leaders, and disadvantaged social groups as the core
forces, they will push for a “bottom-up” approach to Chinese gover-
nance from the grassroots to lay a foundation for changing China. (20)
The rhetorical shift reflected in Zhou Benshun’s article and this recent ed-
itorial in some ways threatens to drown out more differentiated discussions,
and to put a temporary end to more subtle discussions of whether and how
civil society in China is developing, and what direction it should take.
Rhetorically, conceptually, it would almost appear as though “civil society”
must now accept its new state of being officially persecuted. (21)
We must not overlook this rhetoric or its potential implications for of-
ficial attitudes toward Chinese civil society in the years to come; but we
should also pause to assess what, if anything, the new authoritarian hard-
line rhetoric may change or already has changed “on the ground.” The
contributions to this issue address mainly the question of how actual per-
sons, communities, and organisations in the fields of journalism, human
rights lawyering, and religion (with a focus on unregistered churches) have
evolved, and of how NGOs are faring under the current system at both
the domestic and international levels. The repressive anti-liberal rhetoric
of Zhou Benshun et al. cannot tell us, but it underlines the importance of
finding out.
The growth of liberal communities and
communities dependent on liberal values
The contributions to this issue all discuss the conditions of civil society
survival in an authoritarian environment. They are also all remarkable for
their portrayals of civil society entities that struggle and often manage to
survive or re-emerge even after they have come under severe attack from
the state; and in different ways, they reflect on how such struggles affect
other activities and goals of these embattled groups.
The civil society fields discussed are populated, albeit not exclusively, by
communities we can usefully call “liberal” in terms of their own value ori-
entations. Even where there is some tension between their own and (some)
liberal values, such as may arguably be the case with some religious com-
munities, the presence of these communities depends on values directly
challenging authoritarianism, and they in turn are especially at risk under
illiberal “management” and repression.
Toward the party-state, liberal communities in this inclusive broader sense
represent and concentrate the challenges that entity is facing from society
at large. Toward wider society they are engaged in various efforts to inform,
educate, persuade, advocate on behalf of, help, protect, and to some extent
transform the individuals and groups with which they engage. In the age of
the Internet, the potential target group for their various communicative ef-
forts is growing rapidly – it has of course long since expanded beyond na-
tional borders; but as shown in the discussions in this issue, liberal
communities can be expected to have special influence on domestic polit-
ical and social development in China today.
Chan and Wu’s study of evolving relations between government and
NGOs – which they define as “voluntarily formed, not-for-profit, and private
organisations that exhibit a minimum level of institutionalisation and self-
governance” (excluding private charity foundations and social enterprises)
– draws on interviews conducted between 2011 and 2012. (22) In a way that
very much answers the purpose of this issue, the authors provide a cate-
gorisation of NGOs from a perspective of state control, which they explain
using the conceptual frameworks of corporatism and fragmented authori-
tarianism. Implicit in their argument is the commitment to civil society as
an idea that has been so clearly important to both authors’ scholarship and
direct engagement with Chinese civil society,
Chan and Wu argue that “graduated” and categorised control (fenlei
guanzhi 分类管治) explains not only how NGOs are controlled but also
the differentiated strategies used to react to control. Chan and Wu discuss
the effectiveness of such strategies using two case studies as examples.
Their discussion is based in the assessment that governmental monitoring
and control of grassroots NGOs and activism remain “pervasive.”
Depending on their business nature (such as “service” to the community
or “advocacy” in a particular cause), funding sources, and scale (of activities),
measures of control range from mere bureaucratic supervision to “being
asked to tea,” letters to warn the organisation off as potentially subversive,
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18. Zhou Benshun, “Zou Zhongguo tese shehui guanli chuangxin zhi lu” (The path to innovation of
social management with Chinese characteristics), 16 May 2011, www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/
2011/2011010/201105/t20110513_80501.htm (consulted on 20 August 2012); the translation
here is based on that by Flora Sapio at her Forgotten Archipelagoes blog entry of 6 July 2001,
http://florasapio.blogspot.hk/2011/06/belated-translation-zhou-benshun-road.html (consulted
on 20 August 2012). Critically, e.g. Xiao (above note 17).
19. China Digital Times, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2012/08/word-of-the-week-the-new-five-black-
categories (consulted on 20 August 2012). The original “Five elements” or “Five categories of black
elements” (hei wu lei) included landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements,
and rightists. Gucheng Li, A Glossary of Political Terms of the People’s Republic of China, Hong
Kong, The Chinese University Press, 1995), p. 150.
20. People’s Daily, “Zhongguo zhenzheng de tiaozhan shi weilai 5-10 nian” (China’s real challenge is
the 5-10 years ahead), 1 July 2012, http://ccnews.people.com.cn/n/2012/0731/c141677-
18636091.html (consulted on 20 August 2012), and translation by Scott Harold, http://chinadig-
italtimes.net/2012/08/peoples-daily-chinas-real-challenge-is-the-next-5-10-years (consulted on
20 August 2012).
21. See Zhu Jianguo, “Jiushi daqing weihe pan ‘gongmin shehui’ sixing” (Why is “civil society” given
the death sentence at the 90th [Party anniversary]?), Zhengming, June 2011, see online
www.peacehall.com/news/gb/pubvp/2011/06/201106060051.shtml (consulted on 20 August
2012).
22. Chan and Wu, “Graduated Control and Beyond: The Evolving Government-NGO Relations,” in this
issue.
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e.g., because it accepts foreign funding, and in some cases to being closed
down. Readers of this issue will find that categories here developed (and
organised in tables) can be found in the fields discussed by the other con-
tributors.
In their case studies, the authors show that the appropriate response to
increased government control is not necessarily submission or “face-saving”
negotiation with the authorities from a position of weakness. Rather, using
the example of an NGO director who wards off persecution by publishing
an account of his/her midnight summons to the local police station, they
show that going public about such persecution can be effective in some cir-
cumstances.
Nevertheless, the conclusion of this piece reminds us of the apparently
tightening ideological-political constraints of Chinese civil society under the
concept of “social management” or “social administration” (shehui guanli),
as expounded by Zhou Benshun:
Should NGOs register with the government and make themselves
completely transparent to the state? Should NGOs bid for govern-
ment projects and rely on state funding to sustain their operations?
Should NGOs participate in the consultation mechanism of the state
and refrain from taking non-institutional and risky tactics in advo-
cacy? These are questions and dilemmas that Chinese NGOs will
face in the new era of innovation in social administration. (23)
Svensson’s account of journalists’ communities draws on a wealth of in-
formation gathered in interviews conducted over a period of four years. It
is perhaps the first academic study to systematically engage the issue of
how journalists build communities with colleagues and across professional
boundaries, relying especially on Internet communication technology such
as social media, and of how such informal networks and communities affect
their professional and social existence. The article focuses on communities
of investigative journalists. It argues that “with the development of micro-
blogging (weibo 微博) we see new forms of community building [and] more
open expressions of solidarity and ironic resistance.”
Several themes emerge from this discussion: Firstly, Svensson shows that
weibo communities allow investigative journalists to engage more deeply
with their role(s) in society, and to question and reformulate what their
roles should be: “muckrakers,” protectors of the weak, the country’s “con-
science,” or “heroes.” (24) Part of this identity-building process occurs through
what Svensson calls “story-telling” in her in-depth account of how some
individual stories, such as that of the famous Sun Zhigang case, became
founding myths for investigative journalism in China. Secondly, Svensson
shows how new opportunities for interaction particularly strengthen inves-
tigative journalism – how the new communities created give a sense of
“shelter” and spiritual “home” to potentially at-risk or embattled individuals
engaging in such journalism, and how online communities can lead to of-
fline encounters and activities, e.g., through the creation of salons. Thirdly,
she discusses how despite repression, the organised and state controlled
media world can also provide some support to “muckraking” journalists, e.g.,
through the organisation of prizes and by continuing to train journalists in
ways that equip them for the challenges of investigative journalism.
Lastly, in several sections full of narrative colour and detail, she engages
with the many strategies journalists have found to fight back against party-
state control and (incidental) repression. There is, for example, the NPC del-
egate expressing clumsy criticism of a report – only to encounter collective
online exposure and ridicule, including cartoons, in “retaliation.” There is the
terrible story of journalists stopped, by local decree, from following up with
reports about Xu Wu, a petitioner incarcerated in a psychiatric hospital; and
there is the well-known case of the journalist Xie Chaoping, around whose
cause journalists, lawyers, and public figures rallied in an effort of broadly
civil-society-based weiquan (维权), rights defence. “Microblogging by its
very nature opens up for and demands some level of interactivity among
its users,” Svensson concludes. Yet, “Whether weibo can facilitate the cre-
ation of a genuine public sphere in China is open to debate in view of the
ad hoc and fragmented nature of public debates on weibo, marginalisation
of certain voices, and the precarious connection between on-line debates
and off-line mobilisation.”
Like Svensson, Teng Biao in his analysis of rights defence reflects on ac-
tivism developed, to a significant degree, out of a professional community,
and on comparable experiences of evading, negotiating, and opposing con-
trol. (25) The authorities, so far as both professional journalists and profes-
sional lawyers are concerned, have a certain institutional grip on individuals,
be it through licensing, institutionalised censorship, or indirect control of
incomes under state corporatism. But in contrast to Svensson’s journalist
communities, the lawyers and other rights defenders at the centre of Teng’s
discussion are for the most part not professionally trained to make use of
mass communication channels; and they initially encounter these media as
amateurs who, in the case of traditional media at least, are likely to be pas-
sive interviewees reliant on others’ support. (Only a few individuals have,
like the author, combined the professional roles of scholar, public intellec-
tual, and lawyer.)
Teng’s analyses of individual cases of “rights defence” illustrate how it
came about that lawyers, professionally trained to handle cases within the
constraining channels of a formal legal system, became activists making in-
tensive use of traditional and “new” (social) media in individual case advo-
cacy. The basic reason for this is, of course, the authoritarian and corporatist
institutional design and political control of these legal institutions.
The cases discussed in Teng’s piece illustrate how technological progress
has benefited rights defenders by facilitating their communication and abil-
ity to put pressure on the authorities through online appeals. One example
is the famous Sun Zhigang case also cited by Svensson as one of the “pivotal
stories” fostering the image of the investigative journalist. The story of the
young man victimised by the then still extant custody and repatriation
(shourong qiansong 收容遣送) system would never have impressed millions
had it not been for a newspaper willing to publicise it. In the Sun Zhigang
case, the practice of “citizen journalism” and the use of social media had
not really emerged yet, and activists involved in this case relied largely on
“traditional” news-reporting to attract public attention.
With the arrival of the “Web 2.0” age, rights defenders have also been
given “microphones,” to use Yu Jianrong’s famous phrase, (26) and can directly
and actively communicate with large numbers of people. The recent case
of Li Qinghong, a businessman charged with mafia crimes and tortured to
extract a confession, allowed lawyers to become active in numerous roles
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23. Ibid.
24. Marina Svensson, “Media and Civil Society in China: Community building and networking among
investigative journalists and beyond," in this issue.
25. Teng Biao, “Rights Defence (weiquan), Microblogs (weibo), and the Surrounding Gaze (weiguan)
Community building and networking among investigative journalists and beyond,” in this issue.
26. “Yu Jianrong: ‘Everybody has a microphone’,” (translated by Don Weinland), 20 December 2010,
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2010/12/yu-jianrong-%E4%BA%8E%E5%BB%BA%E5%B5%98-
everyone-has-a-microphone (consulted on 20 August 2012).
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closely related to the criminal justice process – to engage in virtual “court-
room rights-defence,” as Teng puts it, and to do so as part of a “legal team”
(lüshituan 律师团). Beyond the courtroom there are multiple forms of In-
ternet-based rights-defence, such as constitutional challenges to bad law,
efforts to democratise lawyers’ professional organisations (at present organs
of state corporatism), and various forms of collective protest.
Lastly, according to Teng’s analysis, there is a more purely “online rights
defence” – encompassing activities that are initiated and take immediate
effect online in the Web 2.0 age. These include online signature campaigns,
the organisation of flash mobs, online rescue campaigns when a rights de-
fender has been detained, symbolic online actions, (real-time) online reports,
and online searches. The new technologies allow for “organising without or-
ganisation,” as the author, quoting Clay Shirky, puts it. They enable people
to break up “many of the traditional dichotomies: between providers and
recipients of information, official and private media, domestic and foreign
media, presence and absence, collective and individual spheres, elite and
grass-roots, and even the political and the non-political.”
Compared with twentieth century activism, these technologies strengthen
what European democracy activists already saw as the potential of “civil
society”: “Havel said that living in truth is the ‘power of the powerless’; (27)
networking technology is likewise the power of the powerless. The Internet
has become ‘liberation technology’ due to Web 2.0 social movements’ grad-
ual subversion of existing associative power structures.” (28)
So, are micro-bloggers in a better position to act as genuine citizens in an
emerging Chinese civil society now than ten or 20 years ago? Teng’s analysis
certainly suggests this; while conceding the obvious weaknesses of online
rights defence, he is noticeably more sanguine and less sceptical than Svens-
son. Perhaps this difference is due in part to the fact that the diverse activ-
ities summarily referred to as “rights defence” can benefit in a unique way
from the versatility and speed of online expression – the point of these ac-
tivities is the protection of rights much more than the exercise of any par-
ticular right, as in the case of journalism (freedom of expression) or religion
(freedom of belief and conscience).
The role potentially played by religion in fostering human rights and the
values underpinning them is examined by Carsten Vala who, for persua-
sively explained reasons, focuses on Protestant Christianity: Buddhism and
Daoism, as historically “entrenched” religions in China, “do not worship a
‘world-transcending’ deity or cherish universal principles that would hold
secular rulers to account.” (29) By contrast, Protestant Christian churches
claimed independence from the state early on, and in terms of both their
European origins and the role they played in the collapse of Eastern Euro-
pean systems acquired a profile defined by their opposition to authoritarian
states. It should be noted in this context that this very value orientation
makes Protestant Christianity attractive to some members of other liberal
communities. (30)
To what extent, if at all, then, can Protestant churches be “sites of demo-
cratic civil society” in the context of an authoritarian system embracing
corporatist structures and committed to the idea of “neo-imperial sacral
hegemony,” as Vala (following Madsen) puts it? To what extent do they
“offer alternative values, defend institutional interests, and limit state
power”?
Vala answers this question with scholarly clarity and detachment. He be-
gins by conceptually organising Protestant Christianity into official churches
under the authority of the Three Self Patriotic Movement association and
its sister organisation, the Christian Council, and unregistered churches (a
term the author prefers to the descriptively imprecise “house churches”), of
which there are different kinds. The article is particularly interested in mem-
bers of urban unregistered Protestant churches, a focus that well suits the
question the article investigates.
It is not especially surprising, perhaps, that Vala finds that “official church
leaders have manoeuvred around restrictions put in place by the party-state,
but in ways that limited the impact on building up norms of democratising
civil society.” By contrast, unregistered church leaders have overall “con-
demned the ‘false’ nature of official churches for obeying the party-state
rather than obeying God.”
Even so, drawing on interviews conducted between 2009 and 2010, Vala
shows that there are important differences amongst unregistered urban
churches. On the one hand, there are those that take an overall uncompro-
mising stance toward Party-State authority. The best-known exemplar of
these is probably the Shouwang Church in Beijing. Churches such as
Shouwang “seek policy change that draws a clear distinction between state
and society in line with a liberal-democratic civil society tradition that dif-
ferentiates political and religious spheres of action,” whereas other unreg-
istered churches, taking a less confrontational approach, “put a higher price
on carrying out religious activities than they do on whether they submit to
party-state control over society.”
Will the more “open and resolute” kind of unregistered Church that is rep-
resented by Shouwang achieve the political goals they appear to have? Vala
is sceptical, noting the comparatively small size of such churches measured
against churches in Eastern Europe, for example, and concludes that “[w]het-
her their efforts will succeed in a historical division of society from state
depends on factors beyond the Protestant churches themselves.” If Vala is
right, we would have to conclude that both kinds of urban unregistered
churches that he analyses may be successful only in the more modest sense
of being able to continue to operate, practicing beliefs that in themselves
challenge political authoritarianism.
As there is so much polarising rhetoric around this topic today, we should
not avoid the difficult issue of international engagement in China’s civil so-
ciety, and we must not leave unexamined the hostile categorisations sug-
gested by the hard-line faction in China’s political leadership. Thomas E.
Kellogg’s contribution faces the problems of international engagement
head-on, and is in some ways written from an “inside” perspective. Drawing
on years of academic as well as practical engagement with this topic, the
article focuses on Western funding for rule-of-law-based initiatives in China,
and provides an argument of clear relevance for this issue.
On the one hand – using a distinction found in Chan and Wu’s contribu-
tion – Kellogg argues that support for grassroots NGOs – in a sense, genuine
civil society organizations – has been comparatively neglected by foreign
donors, who up to now have more willingly collaborated with government-
approved NGOs or GONGOs, and that rights advocacy-based NGO work
– which of course is only a portion of the work that NGOs, including grass-
roots NGOs, do – especially deserves greater support. Advocacy-oriented
groups, in Kellogg’s view, “may be more effective in their pursuit of a pro-
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gressive reform agenda than government-affiliated organisations or univer-
sity-based entities might be, both because they are able to initiate grass-
roots-level momentum for change, and because they are able to have an
impact on the enforcement of China’s own laws, a key weakness that has
hindered progress on the development of the legal system as a whole.” (31)
Among the main reasons for this is, firstly, the fact that there has been a
clear turn away from a rule-of-law orientation in the political leadership –
from the perspective of rule-of-law reform, one might call this a deteriora-
tion at the top, making further investment in top-down reform initiatives
less promising. Secondly, foreign funding organisations have somewhat neg-
lected bottom-up civil society initiatives focusing on fostering rule-of-law
improvements though advocacy, even though in his view such initiatives
have thrived and become more effective in recent years.
The reasons for this may in part be attributed to the “control” considera-
tions analysed by Chan and Wu in their contribution to this issue. However,
in a detailed argument clearly reliant on personal expertise, Kellogg argues
that some of the reasons may lie in the fact that it is more difficult to handle
support for small organisations, to issue many small grants as opposed to a
few large ones, and to operate in diverse locations. Yet donors unwilling to
accept these difficulties, Kellogg warns, risk “contributing less to the devel-
opment of a more vibrant civil society in China and more to the creation of
the kind of well-managed, service-based social sector that many observers
believe is the Chinese government’s overall goal.”
On the other hand, Kellogg argues that certain areas of advocacy should
be supported more readily than others – disability rights, LGBT rights, and
labour rights are examples – while others should not be supported because
there is simply too little hope that such advocacy will result in meaningful
reform. Kellogg mentions specifically criminal justice and the media.
The argument against investing in advocacy in areas of press freedom and
criminal justice could have dampening implications for some of the areas
of civil society development discussed in this issue. Much of rights-defence
is of course inseparable from criminal justice issues – even in cases where
there was an original focus on other causes, rights defenders themselves
can, after all, easily be targeted by criminal “justice.” Moreover, freedom of
thought, speech, and conscience is of central importance if civil society is
to perform the function of supporting and promoting China toward greater
state respect for basic liberties and universal values. Unfortunately, there is
no reason to question the author’s assessment that significant reform in
the areas of criminal justice and media is unlikely. But Kellogg’s argument
is perhaps more a realistic reaction to what Chan and Wu in their contribu-
tion have identified as risk factors for the survival of grassroots NGOs than
it is a rejection of the importance of these high-risk groups.
China’s resilient civil society
The observation and personal experience that animate the empirically
richly-grounded contributions to this issue show that Chinese civil society
is extant and vibrant, as well as fairly resilient. The picture painted by the
contributors leaves three main impressions:
Firstly, Chinese civil society is not merely diverse, but also uniquely com-
partmentalised. This is in evidence especially with regard to fields and com-
munities that have a potentially oppositional political function, and in
reaction to suppression. One major compartmentalisation is that of “inside”
and “outside” the system – a duality of terms reflecting the reality of state
corporatism; and there are signs of further and more complex compartmen-
talisation and fragmentation, all of which can in some way be understood
as the result of the same party-state pressure on civil society.
Secondly, Chinese civil society is controlled and in part persecuted – we
can now affirm this not merely on the basis of the anti-civil-society rhetoric
cited earlier, but also on the basis of observations made “on the ground.”
One of the merits of Chan and Wu’s contribution is its systematic and strin-
gent account of control and persecution, while Kellogg’s article reflects on
the effects of persecution on the crucial issue of foreign (funding) support.
Thirdly, as Vala’s contribution reminds us, the strength of particular groups
is ultimately not determined by the attitudes of the party-state (tolerant
or repressive) but rather by the strengths of their respective popular bases
– potentially, this would include but is not limited to the fifth “black cate-
gory” identified in the July 2012 People’s Daily editorial: the “weak” in so-
ciety, ruoshi qunti (弱势群体).
Of course, one of the implications of anti-liberal civil society persecution
has been that those who try to help vulnerable groups – including many
liberal communities of rights defenders and journalists discussed here – have
become increasingly vulnerable themselves. Indeed, if we are prepared fully
to accept the idea of civil society, we must appreciate that in an authori-
tarian system focused on social management and control, no part of society
can be genuinely strong.
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